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LABOR LAW-Prima Facie Tort Doctrine Bars Unreasonable 
Deprivation of Union Membership-Hurwitz v. Directors 
Guild of A.merica, Inc.* 
In July 1965 the officers of the Directors Guild of America (DGA) 
and the Screen Directors International Guild (SDIG) concluded a 
merger agreement which provided that DGA was to be the surviving 
union and SDIG members were to become members of DGA auto-
matically upon signing the DGA non-Communist loyalty oath.1 Al-
though the SDIG membership ratified the merger agreement by a 
majority vote,2 six members steadfastly refused to sign the oath and 
as a result were not admitted to membership in DGA. They there-
upon brought a diversity suit in a New York federal district court:3 
and moved for a preliminary injunction ordering DGA to admit 
them without requiring them to sign the oath. The court denied the 
motion. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, held, reversed. Deprivation4 of union membership 
inevitably causes economic injury, and therefore constitutes a prima 
facie tort. Although prevention of subversive infiltration may justify 
• !164 F,2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 971 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as 
principal case]. 
I. This oath was identical to the now repealed § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations 
Act, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (1947). It read as follows: 
I am not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and I 
do not believe in, and I am not a member of nor do I support any organization 
that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States government by force 
or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. 
2, The tally was 4!19 to 63 in favor of merger. 
3. Plaintiffs alleged both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The latter claim 
was dropped on appeal, however, when it was admitted that DGA was a union of super-
visors and thus not subject to the provisions of the NLRA. Reply Brief for Appellants, 
p. 3 n.2, principal case. 
4. The court ruled that although plaintiffs had never been members of DGA, they 
did have contract and property rights to DGA membership sufficient to warrant 
treating them "as though • • • [they] had been expelled • • • ." Principal case at 72. 
Nonetheless, the court also stated in dictum that it saw "no sound reason why recovery 
should not be granted for wrongful exclusion as well ••• ," Id. at 72 n.7. 
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the infliction of such injury, the DGA oath was unreasonably vague 
and thus an impermissible means of accomplishing this objective.5 
The decision in the principal case is grounded on the theory that 
"prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a 
cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law ... requires a 
justification if the defendant is to escape."6 The burden of proof 
is thus placed on the defendant to show that his conduct was "justi-
fied." While the prima fade tort theory is fairly well established in 
Anglo-American law,7 its use has traditionally remained confined to 
the original fields of its application: unfair competition8 and labor-
management relations.9 Apparently, prior to the principal case, no 
American court had ever applied the doctrine in actions involving 
either wrongful expulsion or wrongful exclusion from union mem-
bership.10 Other theories of liability are available to members who 
5. Id. at 75. 
6. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (Holmes, J.). 
7. Though apparently medieval in its origins [see Forkosch, An Analysis of the Prima 
Facie Tort Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465-75 (1957)], the prima facie tort theory 
received its first modern statement in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow &: Co. 
[1891] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (Lord Bowen), aff'd [1893] 17 A.C. 25. In Skinner &: Co. v. 
Shew &: Co., [1893] 1 Ch. 413, 422, the same judge said: "At Common Law there was a 
cause of action whenever one person did damage to another, wilfully and intentionally, 
and without just cause or excuse." Holmes introduced the doctrine in America in 
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (dissenting opinion), 
and the United States Supreme Court accepted it in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 
204 (1904). Sir Frederick Pollock also appears to have approved of the doctrine. POLLOCK, 
TORTS 17-18 (15th ed. 1951). For a list of eighteen states in which the theory has been 
accepted, see Note, 52 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 503, 504 n.13 (1952). 
8. See, e.g., Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W. 482 (1913); 
Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 5 So. 2d 277 (1941); 
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 83-84, 70 N.E.2d 401, 402-03 
(1946). 
9. See, e.g., American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 231, 36 
N.E.2d 123, 125 (1941); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 355, 34 N.E.2d 349, 
352, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1951); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947). 
See generally Forkosch, The Doctrine of Just Cause as Applied to Labor Cases, 23 
TEMPLE L.Q. 178 (1950), repr. 1 LAB. L.J. 789 (1950) where it is argued that the prima 
facie tort theory was the true basis upon which all the great pre-NLRA labor-
management relations cases were founded. 
10. In New York, the state in which nearly half of the cases involving union expul-
sions and exclusions have been decided [see Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: 
What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 177 (1960)], the tendency has been to re-
strict rather than to expand the application of the prima facie tort doctrine. In Reinforce, 
Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954), for example, the Court of Appeals 
took the position that in order for the doctrine to apply, the defendant must have been 
motivated solely by actual malice. [For criticism of the New York approach, see Brown, 
The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 
563, 567-74 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the Prima Facie Tort Cause of Action, 
42 COl!NELL L.Q. 465, 477-81 (1957); Note, 52 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 503, 507-08 (1952).] Three 
cases, however, suggest that the prima facie tort doctrine may be applied in expulsion 
situations: Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (woman's rights party 
ordered to reinstate group expelled because of their opposition to party leadership); 
Barile v. Fischer, 197 Misc. 493, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (union held liable in 
tort for blacklisting an expelled member who had refused to pay his dues in protest 
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are arbitrarily expelled from labor organizations;11 thus, arguably, 
the prima fade tort theory will give little or no added protection to 
such members. Indeed, since the Second Circuit treated the principal 
case as involving expulsion, it might have been able to reach the 
same result without resort to prima fade tort. However, the court did 
apply that theory and in dictum went on to add that there was no 
reason why the doctrine should not be equally applicable when a 
worker has been unreasonably excluded from union membership.12 
It is submitted that in exclusion cases the prima fade tort theory will 
provide a necessary and appropriate means for remedying union 
abuses. 
Despite the tremendous growth in the power and influence of 
unions in American industrial sodety,13 courts have consistently 
refused to distinguish labor organizations from other nonprofit, vol-
untary associations.14 Since the basic judicial policy with respect to 
the admissions practices of such groups has traditionally been one 
of noninterference, no special cause of action has been developed for 
the arbitrarily excluded member.15 Furthermore, conceptual diffi-
culties have prevented courts from applying to the exclusion situa-
tion the same rationales used to protect workers in expulsion cases. 
Courts have resorted to two distinct theories in granting relief 
against the union officers' failure to comply with § 9(h) of the NLRA); Orchard v. 
Tunney, [1955] West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 49, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 15 (Man. Ct. App.) (member's 
expulsion from union held prima facie tortious; but on appeal this theory was rejected 
by the Canadian Supreme Court, which held that the case could properly be dealt with 
only under a contract theory. [1957] Can. Sup. Ct. 436, [1957] 8 D.L.R.2d 273). 
11. See text accompanying notes 16-20 infra. 
12. Sec note 4 supra. 
13. Sec Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 33, 39-44 (1947) for 
an excellent short discussion of the development of labor unions from weak, impotent 
groups into powerful economic organizations. 
14. Thus, the general principles that originally were developed to govern the internal 
affairs of social clubs, churches, and fraternal lodges have also been applied to unions. 
Id. at 37-38. For example, the same rules employed in union expulsion situations have 
also been applied to cases involving expulsions from fraternal insurance associations 
[Wilcox v. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum, 210 N.Y. 370, 104 N.E. 624 (1914)], 
the New York Stock Exchange [Cohen v. Thomas, 209 N.Y. 407, 103 N.E. 708 (1913)], and 
the New York Produce Exchange [People ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exch., 
149 N.Y. 401, 44 N.E. 84 (1896)]. For an eloquent criticism of this general policy, see 
Chafce, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930). 
15. The leading cases exemplifying the traditional position are: Walter v. McCarvel, 
309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677 (1941); Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters Ass'n, 47 N.J. 
Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (Ch. 1890); Miller v. Reuhl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. 
Ct. 1938). In the Mayer case, supra, immigrant laborers were prevented from pursuing 
their trade by a combination of union exclusion and closed-shop agreements between 
the union and all the employers in the area. The Vice Chancellor denied the workers 
relief, arguing as follows: 
[T]he [union] ... has clear right •.. to prescribe qualifications for membership; 
it may make it as exclusive as it sees fit; it may make the restriction on the line of 
citizenship, nationality, age, creed, or . . • profession, as well as numbers. This 
power is incident to its cl1aracter as a voluntary association •••. 
Id. at 525, 20 Atl. at 494. 
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to union members who have been arbitrarily expelled. First, the 
union member has been regarded as having a vested property right 
in the assets and benefit programs of the organization to which he 
belongs.16 On this basis, courts have held that his expulsion, if not 
justified by the union's constitution or by-laws, constitutes an illegal 
deprivation of property.17 Second, the act of joining a union has 
been said to create a contract between the individual and the orga-
nization, the terms of which are represented by the provisions of the 
union's constitution and by-laws.18 Thus, if a member has been 
expelled on grounds not provided for in those documents, he has 
a cause of action for breach of contract.19 The resort to contract 
theory, of course, implies that the traditional defenses of contract 
law will be available to both the employee and the union. Thus, in 
rare instances, courts have afforded relief to union members who 
have been expelled in accordance with the rules of the constitution 
or by-laws on the ground that the rule in question was void as against 
public policy or contrary to natural justice.20 Although there is con-
siderable doubt that the property and contract theories accurately 
reflect the worker's actual interests in union membership,21 it appears 
16. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Angrisani v. Stearn, 
167 Misc. 728, 3 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct.), aff d mem. 255 App. Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S.2d 997 
(1938); see Chafee, supra note 14, at 999; Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union 
Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 609, 613 (1959); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union 
Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1051-52 (1951). 
17. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915): Bogni v. Periotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 
N.E. 853 (1916); Angrisani v. Stearn, supra note 16. In the Angrisani case a union was 
directed to reinstate a member who had been expelled for bringing suit against the 
union's officers. The court held that the member's conduct did not violate a union 
by-law that prohibited the carrying on of union business outside union meetings or the 
union's executive board rooms. 
18. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951); Polin v. 
Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); see Chafee, supra note 14, at 1001; Cox, supra 
note 16, at 613; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 
1054 (1951). 
19. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, supra note 18; see Chafee, supra note 14, at 
1001; Cox, supra note 16, at 613, Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 
64 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1049, 1051 (1951). 
20. See, e.g., Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 270 Pa. 
67,113 Atl. 70 (1921), where the court voided the expulsion of a union member who had 
violated a union regulation prohibiting members from using their influence to defeat 
any federal or state legislation. In ordering reinstatement the court said: 
[T]he by-laws, rules, and regulations of [corporations and unincorporated asso• 
ciations] .•• will be enforced only when they are reasonable [citing cases]; and 
they never can be adjudged reasonable when, as here, they would compel the 
citizen to lose his property rights in accumulated assets, or forego the exercise of 
other rights which are constitutionally inviolable. 
Id. at 70. 
21. An employee's only true property interest in union membership lies in the benefit 
programs provided by the labor organization, for if a union member has any property 
right in his union's assets, it certainly bears little resemblance to traditional forms of 
ownership. A member cannot transfer or devise his rights; moreover, if the local to 
which he belongs should be dissolved, its assets will pass to the international rather 
than being divided among the local members. Indeed, even if the assets were divided, 
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that they provide reasonably adequate protection against arbitrary 
expulsions. However, the conceptualization of theories of recovery in 
terms of property and contract rights prevents these theories from 
also being applied to provide remedies for unreasonable exclusions, 
since an excluded applicant for membership, not having a vested 
interest in union assets or benefit programs and not having engaged 
in the act of joining the organization, can assert neither property nor 
contract claims against the union. Thus, it has been asserted that the 
common law provides no basis £or preventing labor organizations 
from refusing a worker's application for membership "for any reason 
or for no reason.''22 
Until very recently, Congress had also made no attempt to regu-
late union admission policies. Section S(b)(l)(A) of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)23 specifically places the regulation of 
union membership policies beyond the purview of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). To be sure, section 8(b)(2) of the 
NLRA24 prohibits unions from causing an employer to discriminate 
against a worker who has been denied union membership for reasons 
other than his failure to tender dues and initiation fees.25 However, 
the share of any individual member would be minimal: a statistical study of thirty-two 
of the largest and wealthiest unions reveals that if the assets of these organizations were 
divided among their respective memberships, each member would only receive approxi-
mately $22. Life, May 31, 1948, pp. 80-81. Thus the interest of a union member in the 
assets of his union clearly is not an accurate measure of the economic and social harm 
which he suffers when expelled. In practice the courts appear to have recognized this 
and consequently do not limit relief to actual damages but invariably order total 
reinstatement. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 853 (1931). 
The contract theory is even more unsatisfactory. Few ordinary contracts would be 
enforced if phrased in terms as vague as those found in most union constitutions and 
by-laws. There is also a serious question whether the requisite mutuality of obligation 
exists, since the union is generally free to change its regulations by majority vote over 
the objections of any individual member. Finally, it is totally unrealistic to treat the 
act of joining a union as a "bargain" between two equally free "contracting" parties: 
"The man is supposed to have contracted to give •.• [the union] these great powers; 
but in practice he has no choice in the matter. If he is to engage in the trade, he has to 
submit to the rules promulgated by the [union's executive] committee .••• " Lee v. 
Showmen's Guild, (1952) 1 All E.R. 1175, 1181 (C.A.) (Lord Justice Denning). 
22. Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 33, 38 (1947); see note 
15 supra and accompanying text. 
23. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964): 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ••• to 
restrain •• , employees in the exercise of the rights •.• guaranteed in section 7: 
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization 
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-
bership therein •••• 
24, 61 Stat, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964): 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ••• to 
cause ••• an employer to discriminate against an employee •.• to whom membership 
in such or!f!tnization has been denied or terminated on some ground other 
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly 
required as a condition for acquiring or retaining membership •••• 
25. Thus, in Hoisting &: Portable Eng'rs, Local 4, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 
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while this prov1S1on assures an employee the right to obtain or 
retain a job without arbitrary union interference, it does not force 
the union to accept him into membership even when a "union shop" 
agreement is in effect. The Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)26 significantly limited the right of 
labor organizations arbitrarily to discipline their members;21 how-
ever, attempts to extend protection to applicants for union mem-
bership were expressly rejected.28 
In 1964 Congress did substantially restrict the right of labor 
unions to exclude workers from membership. Section 703(c) of the 
Civil Rights Act29 prohibits a labor organization from discriminating 
in any way on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Any person claiming to be aggrieved under this provision may file 
a ·written charge with the Equal Employment Opportunities Com-
mission,80 which will attempt to resolve the dispute through informal 
141 N.L.R.B. 1231 (1963), the Board held that the union had violated § 8(b)(2) when it 
caused an employer to discharge a worker because he was known as a "wage cutter" and, 
therefore, was not acceptable to the union's membership. 
26. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). 
27. The act purports to create a "Bill of Rights" for union members. 73 Stat. 522 
(1959), 29 u.s.c. §§ 411-15 (1964). 
28 .• While the LMRDA was still in House committee, Representative Powell of New 
York proposed an amendment providing that "no labor organization shall discriminate 
unfairly in its representation of all employees in the negotiation and administration of 
collective bargaining agreements, or refuse membership, segregate or expel any person 
on the grounds of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin." (Emphasis added.) 
However, the bill's two sponsors opposed adoption of the amendment. 
Mr. Landrum: 
·we do not seek in this legislation, in no way, no shape, no guise, to tell the labor 
unions of this country whom they shall admit to their unions. No part of this 
legislation attempts to do that ..•. The law is designed only to say that, if [a man] 
... is a member of a union, he shall have equal rights .•.. Vve do not here seek 
to withdraw or take away from the unions the right to fix their own rules for the 
acquisition or retention of membership .... 
Mr. Griffin: 
Everybody knows why this particular amendment was offered at this time-to kill 
the legislation. The labor reform legislation before the House . . . does not 
touch or deal in any way with the admission to, or retention of, membership in a 
union. 
The record of the entire debate appears in !I LEGISLATIVE HISIORY OF THE LABOR• 
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959 1648-51 (1959). 
29. 78 Stat. 255-56, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964): 
It shall be unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(!) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate 
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; · 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse 
to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an indi-
vidual in violation of this section. 
30. 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964). 
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procedures.31 Should these procedures fail, the complainant is then 
permitted to bring a civil suit in federal district court.32 
Although in theory the Civil Rights Act should provide a remedy 
for the most common33 types of arbitrary exclusion from union 
membership, procedural barriers in the act may prevent it from 
being fully effective.34 Moreover, while the coverage of the act is 
broad, it is not all-inclusive. The Commerce Clause is an absolute 
limit on its applicability.35 In addition, there are a number of types 
of discrimination to which its protection does not even purport to 
extend. Exclusion on the grounds of unorthodox political beliefs is 
in no way proscribed. The act does not prohibit unions from making 
the signing of a non-Communist affidavit a prerequisite for member-
ship. Nor does it forbid unions to expel or exclude workers because 
they favor "right-to-work" laws or political candidates not approved 
by the union leadership. Another basis for discrimination that re-
mains legally acceptable is nepotism, a practice quite prevalent in 
the building trades unions.36 Many of these organizations for years 
have restricted membership on a racial basis;37 thus, the effect of 
allowing "family unions" to continue is to permit the virtual total 
exclusion of nonwhite groups from the skilled craft unions. 
In light of the tremendous economic and social importance which 
31. The act requires the Commission first to try to eliminate the alleged unlawful 
practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) 
(1964). 
32. 78 Stat. 260-61, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e) & (f) (1964). Upon application of the 
complainant, it is within the discretion of the court to appoint an attorney to conduct 
the litigation without payment of fees. 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). The 
court may also permit the Attorney General to intervene if he should certify that the 
case is of general public importance. 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). 
33. See Hewitt, The Right To Join a Labor Union, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 919-22 (1951) 
which indicates that the great majority of arbitrary union exclusions involve racial 
discrimination. 
34. See, e.g., Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Apprentice-
ship, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 314 (1965): "[T]here is no reason to believe the federal 
law will be any more effective than have been similar state laws. . . . Indeed, since 
the federal law contains many procedural barriers to enforcement, we may well expect 
it to be less effective." See text accompanying notes 58-59 infra for a discussion of 
the procedural advantage of the prima facie tort theory. 
35. 78 Stat. 254-55, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-l(e) to (g) (1964). 
36. See Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 34, at 304-06. 
37. A 1964 study of apprenticeship statistics discloses a tremendous racial imbalance. 
The following figures show the percentage of Negro apprentices in some of the larger 
industrial areas: California-1.9%; Connecticut-0.5%; Maryland-0.8%; Montgomery 
County, Md. (outside Washington, D.C.)-0%; New Jersey-0.5%; New York-2%. In 
the cities of Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Newark, and St. Louis there are no Negro ap• 
prentices in any of the printing or building trades unions. Id. at 289-91. The 1950 
census reveals that in the nation as a whole Negroes comprise only 0.3% of the tool 
and die makers, only I% of the electricians, only 2% of the machinists and millwrights, 
only 2.4% of the cabinetmakers, and only 3.9% of the carpenters. On the other hand, 
the percentage of Negro participation in certain other trades is considerably higher; 
cement finishers-26.1 %; brickmasons, stonemasons, and tilesetters-10.9%; paper-
hangers-II.I%; structural metal workers-7.2%; and roofers and slaters-6.94%. 
MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 110 (1965). 
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union membership has come to have in the modem industrial society, 
protection against arbitrary exclusion should be given to all workers 
and not left to piecemeal legislation. Labor organizations long ago 
ceased to bear more than the most superficial resemblance to other 
voluntary associations, and presently exert extensive influence over 
the lives of millions of workers. Unions are generally in control of 
employee grievances "from the shop committee stage, up to arbitra-
tion."88 While every labor organization regulated by the NLRA has 
a legal duty to represent fairly nonunion members, 89 a breach of this 
duty is often difficult to prove.40 Thus, the nonmember may not 
always receive the protection to which he is entitled. Deprivation of 
union membership can also have a substantial defamatory effect: in 
many trades social acceptability is directly related to membership in 
a labor organization. Yet, while some courts· have recognized this by 
awarding damages for loss of reputation due to wrongful suspensions 
and expulsions,41 they apparently have never done so in cases of arbi-
trary exclusion. 
The NLRA has magnified the importance of union membership 
and has diminished the power of the individual vis-a-vis his employer. 
Under section 9(a) of the NLRA,42 a union which is selected by a 
majority of the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit becomes 
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in that 
unit. An employee's only weapons for inducing the union to perform 
in accordance with his desires are his rights to vote, run for office, and 
participate in union meetings.43 Since these weapons are not available 
to nonmembers, they are bound by collective bargaining contracts 
negotiated by organizations in whose policies they have no voice. 
They also run the risk of being discriminated against at the bar-
gaining table. If particular bargaining goals are being urged by non 
union members, the union's legal duty of fair representation might be 
insufficient to insure that the negotiators, over whose selection the 
nonmembers have no control, will pursue those goals in good faith.44 
38. Hewitt, supra note 33, at 924. 
39. Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 201-04 (1944). 
40. Hewitt, supra note 33, at 923: 
Because of the intangibles involved and the difficulty of proving unfair differ-
entiation, the right to a fair representation has not, in its enforcement, always 
proved effective in preventing unjust treatment. And if the worker is not a 
participant, he may not always know whether he is being fairly represented. 
41. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139 (1950); 
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965). 
42. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964): 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining 
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall 
be the exclusive bargaining representatives of all the employees in such unit. ••• 
43. See Hewitt, supra note 33, at 924; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Dis-
cipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1056 (1951); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair 
Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1329 (1958). 
44. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. See generally Blumrosen, Legal Pro-
tection Against Exclusion From Union Activities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 21 (1961). 
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A final weakness in the existing law is that "supervisory" em-
ployees and employees who do not qualify under the Commerce 
Clause limitation of the NLRB's authority are not covered by the 
protective provisions of the NLRA. Nonmembers who fall within 
either of these categories may actually be prevented from obtaining 
or retaining employment, since in the majority of states without 
"right-to-work" laws, labor organizations, when not covered by the 
NLRA, remain free to enter into contracts which bind employers to 
hire only union members and to enforce such contracts by strikes or 
threats to strike.45 
Thus the need for greater protection of the individual worker 
against unreasonable union admissions policies is apparent. Yet the 
three most commonly proposed remedies are unsatisfactory. First, it 
has been argued that since unions exercise vast power over the 
nation's economy as a direct result of the protection afforded them by 
federal legislation, they should be treated as governmental instru-
mentalities and consequently should be subjected to the constitu-
tional limitations applicable to such instrumentalities.46 Courts have 
found this argument troublesome. The approach might result in 
rendering unconstitutional section 102(a)(2) of the LMRDA, which 
allows unions to restrict speech and assembly considered detrimental 
to the union as an institution.47 Beyond this, there is a rather im-
45. The position of unions not covered by the NLRA is directly analogous to that 
of all labor organizations prior to 1947 when the Taft-Hartley Act added § 8(b)(2) 
to the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, pre-1947 decisions are helpful in in-
dicating the extent to which unions, not limited by federal legislation, can affect 
the ability of nonmember workers to earn a livelihood in their chosen trade. The 
vast majority of these cases held that unions could simultaneously pursue arbitrary 
membership policies and enforce closed-shop agreements. See note 22 supra. The 
courts of only three states appear to have deviated from this rule: James v. Marinship 
Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P .2d 329 (1944); Wilson v. Newspaper &: Mail Deliverers 
Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938); Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 
194, 4 A.2d 886 (1939). In each of these cases the union was enjoined from arbitrarily 
excluding workers, but was not prohibited from enforcing a union-shop agreement. 
This would appear to be the appropriate means for protecting workers since a 
judicial refusal to enforce a union-shop agreement would contravene the legislative 
policy of those states which have not enacted "right-to-work" laws. It is important 
to note, however, that the prima facie tort theory would also accomplish this objective 
without vitiating the effect of union-shop agreements. 
46. Hewitt, supra note 33, at 939-42. At 942, the author states: "In negotiating a 
collective bargaining contract, and otherwise representing the workers, the recognized 
union is exercising legislative and governmental power." A similar opinion is ex-
pressed in Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 
1074 (1951): "If unions are recognized as a form of industrial government, then the 
rights of a member within a union should be equivalent to the rights of a citizen 
within a democratic society." The author of the Note in 58 HARv. L. REv. 448 (1945), 
on the other hand, takes a slightly different tack, argning that the certification of 
discriminatory unions is unconstitutional. 
47. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(2) (1964): 
Every member of a labor organization shall have the right to • • • express any 
views, arguments, or opinions .•. Provided, That nothing herein shall be con-
strued to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reason-
able rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an 
institution •••• 
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precise fear among courts and commentators that treating unions as 
instrumentalities of the government will jeopardize union autonomy 
by inviting increased governmental regulation of legitimate union 
activities.48 While such fears may be unjustified, only the Supreme 
Court of Kansas has accepted the government-instrumentality ap-
proach.49 Second, Congress has been urged to enact a law prohibiting 
labor organizations from excluding applicants for membership on 
any arbitrary or unreasonable grounds.50 Such legislation could 
clearly be effective and would have the additional advantage of 
providing a national standard which would be subject to Supreme 
Court review. However, since Congress has shown no sign of being 
prepared to interfere further in internal union affairs, this approach 
does not appear to be a practical alternative. Third, it has been sug-
gested that the NLRB expand its operations into the exclusion-
expulsion area.51 Several cases suggest that the NLRB is willing to 
remedy unreasonable expulsions and suspensions in certain partic-
ularized circumstances.62 However, the proviso to section 8(b)(l)(A) 
of the NLRA53 is so explicit in its protection of the right of unions 
to "prescribe ... [their] own rules with respect to the acquisition 
and retention of membership therein ... " that it seems unlikely 
that arbitrary expulsion or exclusion cases can generally be remedied 
by the NLRB. 
48. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359, 363 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1958) (holding that Negro workers have no 
constitutional right to admission to membership in a union representing them under 
the Railway Labor Act); Cox, supra note 16, at 620: 
It has also been argued that the powers which the NLRA vests in labor unions are 
so far governmental that all actions, including election and rejection of members, 
are subject to the restrictions which the fifth and fourteenth amendments impose 
upon the federal and state authorities. . . . In my opinion the reasoning is 
highly dangerous. The implications of calling labor unions governmental instru• 
mentalities are not easy to perceive but surely the designation would invite more 
and more regulation with consequent loss of independence. 
49. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) (holding that a union which 
represented Negro employees under the Railway Labor Act was constitutionally bound 
to admit them to membership). 
50. Aaron & Kamaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. 
REv. 425, 631 (1949); Cox, supra note 16, at 620-24; Hewitt, supra note 33, at 944-46 
(but prefers creation of a common-law "right to union membership''); Summers, The 
Right To Join a Union, 47 CoLUM, L. REv. 33, 68-74 (1947) (regards this as the only 
practical way to solve the problem in light of the lack of likelihood that the courts 
will adopt the constitutional approach). 
51. Note, Union Disciplinary Power and Section S(bXZXA) of the National Labor 
Relations Act: Limitations on the Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 584 (1966). 
52. In Local 138, Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 
679 (1964) the Board overruled prior authority and held that a union could not fine 
a member for having filed unfair practice charges against it. This decision was expanded 
into the expulsion area in Cannery Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. No. 47 Qune 21, 1966), where 
the Board ruled that a union could not expel a member for filing charges with the 
Regional Director. Moreover, in Philadelphia Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 
159 N.L.R.B. No. 124 Qune 27, 1966), it was held that a member could not be expelled 
for inducing a nonmember to charge the union with an unfair labor practice. 
53. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964). 
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The prima facie tort doctrine avoids the difficulties inherent in 
these approaches and in the traditional common-law property and 
contract theories. It affords the worker the broadest possible protec-
tion against unreasonable deprivation of membership status, while 
not unduly limiting the freedom of labor organizations to pursue 
legitimate union interests. Because prima facie tort is wholly a com-
mon-law doctrine, 64 the protection it provides is not confined within 
the jurisdictional limits that restrict the reach of federal labor legisla-
tion and the Civil Rights Act. Yet, unlike the traditional common-
law theories,05 the tort principle is applicable in exclusion as well as 
expulsion cases. Moreover, the theory recognizes that the worker's 
real interest in union membership rests not on semifictional property 
and contract rights, 66 but rather on the benefits that he derives from 
having a voice in the organization that represents him. Finally, the 
prima fade tort doctrine could prove even more effective in cases of 
racial discrimination than the remedies provided in the Civil Rights 
Act. 67 A party suing under that act has the burden of showing that the 
rejection of his membership application was a product of racial 
discrimination,ns a difficult task at best. On the other hand, under the 
prima facie tort theory, once a worker can show that he was excluded, 
the burden of proof shifts to the union to show that the denial of 
membership was "justified." 
Despite the broad protection the doctrine affords the individual 
employee, its use will not prevent unions from imposing reasonable 
membership requirements. A fundamental aspect of the prima fade 
tort principle is that the defendant will not be held liable if he can 
show justification for his action.ri9 Consequently, while the theory will 
prevent unions from arbitrarily restricting their membership, it will 
not proscribe the good-faith application of reasonable admissions 
standards.00 Occupational skill requirements, nondiscriminatory 
quotas, rules barring adherents to "dual unionism," and provisions 
for weeding out persons who have clearly manifested subversive 
54. Sec note 7 supra. 
55. Sec note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
56. Sec note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
57. Sec notes 29-32 &: 34 supra and accompanying text. 
58. The act merely allows the aggrieved party to bring suit in federal court and 
docs nothing to relieve the plaintiff of his traditional burden to prove his case. 78 
Stat. 260-61, 41 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e) &: (f) (1964). 
59. In unfair trade cases, one who puts another out of business will escape liability 
if he can prove he was acting in the course of otherwise lawful business competition. 
Sec, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 151, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909). Similarly, in 
labor-management relations cases, advancement of worker interests will "justify" 
causing injury to an employer through a strike. See, e.g., Opera on Tour, Inc. v. ·weber, 
285 N.Y. 348, 360-75, 34 N.E.2d 349, 354-61 (dissenting opinion of Justice Lehman), 
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1941). 
60. In Hurwitz the court suggested that a union may lawfully restrict its member-
ship if the restriction is "necessary for the union's welfare and [is] ••• invoked in good 
faith and without malice." Principal case at 74. 
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tendencies all might still legally be imposed. Thus, there is no danger 
that the application of prima facie tort to prevent arbitrary union 
exclusions will conflict with the provisions of the NLRA61 and the 
LMRDA 62 which are designed to permit labor organizations to 
protect themselves against infiltration by persons whose membership 
would be detrimental to the union as an institution.63 Moreover, 
unlike the treatment of unions as governmental instrumentalities, the 
use of the doctrine will not jeopardize union autonomy.64 
A significant practical advantage of the prima facie tort theory is 
that there are no obstacles preventing the courts from immediately 
applying it to union exclusions. As noted earlier,65 many states long 
ago adopted the doctrine into their common law. While none has 
expanded its application to cover internal union affairs, the principal 
case indicates the facility with which this may be done. Nor is there a 
problem of federal pre-emption: the Supreme Court has held that 
union expulsions are primarily a matter of state law, 66 the LMRDA 
expressly leaves undiminished the power of the states to regulate 
internal union affairs,67 and the Civil Rights Act specifically makes 
provision for resort to state procedures.68 
Conclusion 
The growth of the influence of labor organizations has brought 
with it an increase in the value of union membership. As a result, 
deprivation of union membership has come to have a more significant 
effect upon the person so deprived. If the union action causing this 
hardship is unjustifiable, the injured worker should be afforded legal 
protection. The most logical, effective, and practicable means of 
granting this protection is through the application of the prima facie 
tort doctrine. 
61. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964), quoted in note 23 supra. 
62. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(2) (1964), quoted in note 47 supra. 
63. The language of the LMRDA is expressly limited to such situations. 73 Stat. 
522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(2) (1964), quoted in note 47 supra. Although the NLRA 
provision is broader [61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964), quoted in 
note 23 supra], it has been applied primarily to cases where expulsion was justified 
in order to preserve the union's very existence. See, e.g., Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 
151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965) (expulsion of members for filing decertification petition is 
within proviso to § S(b)(l)(A)). 
64. For example, the doctrine could have no restrictive force in the area of labor• 
management relations where the common law is pre-empted by federal legislation. 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that the 
state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB when• 
ever the activity which is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably either pro-
hibited by § 8 or protected by § 7 of the NLRA). 
65. See note 7 supra. 
66. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). 
67. 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964). 
68. 78 Stat. 259-60, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) 8: (c) (1964). 
